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Abstract
Recently, a colour image encryption algorithm based on chaos was proposed by cascading two position permutation oper-
ations and one substitution operation, which are all determined by some pseudo-random number sequences generated by
iterating the Logistic map. This paper evaluates the security level of the encryption algorithm and finds that the position
permutation-only part and the substitution part can be separately broken with only ⌈(log2(3MN))/8⌉ and 2 chosen plain-
images, respectively, where MN is the size of the plain-image. Concise theoretical analyses are provided to support the
chosen-plaintext attack, which are verified by experimental results also.
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1. Introduction
Security of multimedia data (image, video, au-
dio/speech) become more and more important as it is trans-
mitted over all kinds of wired/wireless networks more
and more frequently. Both design and security analysis
of multimedia encryption algorithms have been received
keen attention of the related researchers in the past decade
[1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. Due to the subtle similarity between some
dynamical properties of chaos, like sensitivity to changes
of initial condition and control parameter of chaotic sys-
tems, and the basic properties of cryptography, diffusion
and confusion, chaos was considered as a special way to
design secure and efficient encryption algorithm [6, 7, 8].
As image data is a representative form of multimedia data,
and it helps to show the claimed good performances of the
proposed encryption algorithms, most chaos-based encryp-
tion algorithms adopt image data as encryption object.
According to the record of Web of Science, more than
four hundred papers on designing chaos-based image en-
cryption schemes were published between 1997 and 2011
(inclusive). Meanwhile, no more than one hundred and half
papers on security analysis of chaos-based image encryp-
tion schemes were published. Short of scrutiny on the se-
curity makes many chaos-based image encryption schemes
are insecure against some conventional attacks, such as
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known/chosen-plaintext attack and chosen-ciphertext at-
tack [9, 10, 11, 12]. Some representative chaos-based en-
cryption algorithms and a general framework evaluating se-
curity of this class of encryption algorithms were concluded
in [13]. In many chaos-based image encryption algorithms,
a chaos system, composed of one or more chaotic maps, is
used to generate pseudo-random number sequence (PRNS),
which is then adopted to determine and control combina-
tion of some basic encryption functions [14, 15]. In dig-
ital domain, finite precision computation and quantization
process make some dynamical properties of chaos system
be degenerated in some form, which may cause potential
threat to security of the chaos-based encryption algorithms
[16].
The present paper analyzes the security of the image
encryption algorithms proposed in [17] and finds that the
three basic encryption operations of the algorithm are all
key-invertible, i.e. the unknown information controlling an
encryption operation can be derived directly from the in-
put and its output result. Furthermore, the three encryption
functions are run independently. So, the position permu-
tation part and the substitution part of the image encryp-
tion algorithm under study can be broken separately with
a few chosen plain-images. Both detailed theoretical anal-
yses and experimental results are presented to support the
chosen-plaintext attack.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The
next section introduces the image encryption algorithm un-
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der study briefly. Section 3 presents an efficient chosen-
plaintext attack on the encryption algorithm with some ex-
perimental results. The last section concludes the paper.
2. The colour image encryption algorithm under study
The plaintext of the encryption algorithm under study is
a RGB colour image of size M × N (height×width), which
can be represented as a M×N×3 matrix of pixel values I =
{I(i, j, k)}M−1,N−1,2i=0, j=0,k=0 = {(R(i, j),G(i, j), B(i, j))}M−1,N−1i=0, j=0 . Sim-
ilarly, the corresponding cipher-image is denoted by I′ =
{I′(i, j, k)}M−1,N−1,2i=0, j=0,k=0 = {(R′(i, j),G′(i, j), B′(i, j))}M−1,N−1i=0, j=0 .
Then, the colour image encryption algorithm under study
can be described as follows1.
• The secret key is composed of two positive integers
m1, m2, and two sets of initial condition and control
parameter of the logistic map
f (x) = µ · x · (1 − x), (1)
(x0, µ0), (x∗0, µ∗0), where x0, x∗0 ∈ (0, 1), and µ0, µ∗0 ∈
(3.5699456, 4).
• The initialization procedure:
(1) Iterate the logistical map (1) m1 times from initial
condition x0 to obtain a new initial condition under
fixed control parameter µ0. Then, further iterate it 3M
times to get a chaotic states sequence {Xl}3M−1l=0 . Fi-
nally, a permutation sequence {Tl}3M−1l=0 is derived by
comparing {Xl}3M−1l=0 and its sorted version, where XTl
is the l-th largest element in the sequence {Xl}3M−1l=0 .
(2) Iterate the logistical map (1) m2 times from ini-
tial condition x∗0 to obtain a new initial condition un-
der fixed control parameter µ∗0. Then, further iterate it
3MN times to get a chaotic states sequence {X∗l }
3MN−1
l=0 .
For i = 0 ∼ M − 1, obtain another permutation se-
quence {T ∗i,l}
3N−1
l=0 by comparing {X
∗
3iN+l}
3N−1
l=0 and its
sorted version, where X∗3iN+T ∗i,l is the l-th largest ele-
ments in sequence {X∗3iN+l}
3N−1
l=0 .
(3) Generate a PRNS {Yl}3MN−1l=0 from the sequence
{X∗l }
3MN−1
l=0 via Yl = ⌊X
∗
l · 10
14⌋ mod 3, where
(a mod b) = a − b · ⌊a/b⌋
when b , 0.
(4) To make the numbers of the three different ele-
ments in {Yl}3MN−1l=0 are all equal to MN, update the last
1To make the presentation more concise and complete, some notations
in the original paper [17] are modified under the condition that essential
form of the encryption algorithm is kept unchanged.
3MN − 1 elements as follows: for l = 1 ∼ 3MN − 1,
set
Yl =

1, if Yl = 0, n0 ≥ MN and n1 < MN,
2, if Yl = 0, n0 ≥ MN and n1 ≥ MN,
2, if Yl = 1, n1 ≥ MN and n2 < MN,
0, if Yl = 1, n1 ≥ MN and n2 ≥ MN,
0, if Yl = 2, n2 ≥ MN and n0 < MN,
1, if Yl = 2, n2 ≥ MN and n0 ≥ MN,
where n0, n1, n2 represent the number of 0, 1, 2 in
{Yi}l−1i=0, respectively.
(5) Generate another PRNS {Zl}3MN−1l=0 from the se-
quence {X∗l }
3MN−1
l=0 via Zl = ⌊X
∗
l · 10
14⌋ mod 256.
• The encryption procedure is a simple concatenation of
the following three encryption operations.
(1) Row permutation: for i = 0 ∼ M−1, j = 0 ∼ N−1,
k = 0 ∼ 2, set
I∗(i, j, k) = I(i∗, j, k∗),
where i∗ = TkM+i mod M, k∗ = ⌊TkM+i/M⌋.
(2) Column permutation: for i = 0 ∼ M − 1, j = 0 ∼
N − 1, k = 0 ∼ 2, set
I∗∗(i, j, k) = I∗(i, j∗∗, k∗∗),
where j∗∗ = T ∗i,kN+ j mod N, k∗∗ = ⌊T ∗i,kN+ j/N⌋.
(3) Substitution: First, let
I′(0, 0, Y0) = (I∗∗(0, 0, Y0) + Z0) mod 256. (2)
Then, one pixel is selected iteratively from the other
un-encrypted pixels of the intermediate image I∗∗ =
{I∗∗(i, j, k)}M−1,N−1,2i=0, j=0,k=0 according to a PRNS {Yl}3MN−1l=1 ,
determining which channel’s pixel is chosen. The se-
lected pixels are encrypted by the previous selected
pixel, the corresponding cipher-pixel and a pseudo-
random number as follows: calculate
I′(i, j, k) = (I∗∗(i, j, k) + I∗∗(i′, j′, k′)
+ I′(i′, j′, k′) + Zl) mod 256 (3)
for l = 1 ∼ 3MN − 1, where
i = ⌊nk/N⌋, j = nk mod N, k = Yl,
i′ = ⌊nk′/N⌋, j′ = nk′ mod N, k′ = Yl−1,
nk and nk′ represent the number of k and k′ in {Yt}lt=0
and {Yt}l−1t=0, respectively.
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• The decryption procedure is similar to the encryption
one except the following points: (1) the above en-
cryption operations are run in a reverse order; (2) the
permutation sequences are replaced by their invertible
versions; (3) equation (2) and Eq. (3) are replaced by
I∗∗(0, 0, Y0) = (I′(0, 0, Y0) − Z0) mod 256
and
I∗∗(i, j, k) = (I′(i, j, k) − I∗∗(i′, j′, k′)
− I′(i′, j′, k′) − Zl) mod 256,
respectively.
3. Chosen-plaintext attack
In [17, Sec. 3.2.6], it is claimed that the image encryption
algorithm under study is robust against chosen-plaintext at-
tack based on the following two points: (a) the used PRNSs
are all sensitive to changes of secret key; (b) the substitu-
tion function (3) owns a feed-back mechanism. However,
we will show that the claim is not right in this section. As
the image encryption algorithm under study is composed of
three independent encryption operations, the position per-
mutation part and the substitution part can be broken sepa-
rately with a strategy of Divide and Conquer.
As for plain-images of fixed value, both the Row permu-
tation and the Column permutation are canceled and only
the Substitution is left. Assume two chosen plain-images of
fixed value I1 = {I1(i, j, k) ≡ d1}, I2 = {I2(i, j, k) ≡ d2} are
available. From Eq. (2), one has
I′1(0, 0, Y0) = (I1(0, 0, Y0) + Z0) mod 256 (4)
and
I′2(0, 0, Y0) = (I2(0, 0, Y0) + Z0) mod 256. (5)
Subtract Eq. (5) from Eq. (4), one has
(I′1(0, 0, Y0) − I′2(0, 0, Y0)) ∈ {D, D − 256, D + 256}, (6)
where D = d1 − d2. Referring to Eq. (3), one has
I′1(i, j, k) = (I1(i, j, k) + I1(i′, j′, k′)
+ I′1(i′, j′, k′) + Zl) mod 256, (7)
I′2(i, j, k) = (I2(i, j, k) + I2(i′, j′, k′)
+ I′2(i′, j′, k′) + Zl) mod 256 (8)
for l = 1 ∼ 3MN − 1, where (i, j, k) and (i′, j′, k′) are de-
termined by {Yt}lt=0 and {Yt}l−1t=0 respectively, as the above
section. Subtract Eq. (8) from Eq. (7), one has
(I′1− I′2)(i, j, k) ≡ (2D+(I′1− I′2)(i′, j′, k′)) (mod 256) (9)
where (I′1 − I′2)(i, j, k) = I′1(i, j, k) − I′2(i, j, k), and (I′1 −
I′2)(i′, j′, k′) = I′1(i′, j′, k′) − I′2(i′, j′, k′), the same here-
inafter.
Then, a property of (I′1 − I′2) can be presented as follows.
Property 1. Difference between the cipher-images of I1
and I2 satisfies that
(I′1 − I′2)(i, j, Yl) ≡ ((2l + 1)D) (mod 256) (10)
for l = 0 ∼ 3MN − 1, where (i, j) = (0, 0) when l = 0,
(i, j) = (⌊(nYl + 1)/N⌋, (nYl + 1) mod N) otherwise, and nYl
denotes the number of the elements in {Yt}l−1t=0, whose values
are equal to Yl.
Proof. This property can be proved via mathematical in-
duction on l. When l = 0, one can get
(I′1 − I′2)(0, 0, Y0) ≡ D (mod 256)
from Eq. (6), which means Eq. (10) holds for l = 0. Assume
Eq. (10) holds for l = l∗, i.e.,
(I′1 − I′2)(i, j, Yl∗) ≡ ((2l∗ + 1)D) (mod 256)
where l∗ < 3MN − 1. Then, let us study the case for l =
(l∗ + 1). From Eq. (9), one has
(I′1 − I′2)(i, j, Yl∗+1) ≡ (2D + (I′1 − I′2)(i, j, Yl∗ )) (mod 256)
= ((2(l∗ + 1) + 1)D) (mod 256).
This completes the mathematical induction, hence finishes
the proof of the property.
Utilizing Property 1, one can get the estimated version of
Y0,
Ŷ0 =

0 if (I′1 − I′2)(0, 0, 0) ≡ D (mod 256),
1 if (I′1 − I′2)(0, 0, 1) ≡ D (mod 256),
2 if (I′1 − I′2)(0, 0, 2) ≡ D (mod 256),
(11)
when D , 128. Obviously, one can assure Ŷ0 = Y0 defi-
nitely when
#
({k | (I′1 − I′2)(0, 0, k) ≡ D (mod 256)}) = 1, (12)
where #(·) denotes the cardinality of a set. Once the value
of Y0 is determined, the estimated values of {Yl}3MN−1l=1 ,
{Ŷl}3MN−1l=1 , can be obtained in order with the similar method,
namely set
Ŷl = k if (I′1 − I′2)(ik, jk, k) ≡ ((2l + 1)D) (mod 256)
for l = 1 ∼ 3MN − 1, where ik = ⌊(nk + 1)/N⌋, jk =
(nk+1) mod N, and nk represents the number of k in {Ŷt}l−1t=0.
Referring to [18, Sec. 5.4], one can get period of the
sequence {(2l∗ + 1)D) mod 256}3MN−1l∗=0 , T = 2562·gcd (D,256) =
128
gcd (D,256) . To help estimate success probability of this at-
tack, we give another property of (I′1 − I′2) as follows.
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Property 2. Inequality
#
({k | (I′1 − I′2)(ik, jk, k) ≡ ((2l∗ + 1)D) (mod 256)}) > 1
holds if and only if
Yl∗+S < {Yl}l
∗+S−1
l=l∗ , (13)
where (S mod T ) = 0, ik = ⌊(nk + 1)/N⌋, jk = (nk + 1) mod
N, and nk represents the number of k in {Yt}l∗−1t=0 .
Proof. Assume, for the purpose of contradiction, that cer-
tain l∗ satisfies Yl∗+S < {Yl}l
∗+S−1
l=l∗ and such that
#
({k | (I′1 − I′2)(ik, jk, k) ≡ ((2l∗ + 1)D) (mod 256)}) = 1.
From Property 1 and the hypothesis, one has
(2l∗ + 1)D , (2(l∗ + S ) + 1)D (mod 256),
which leads to
0 , 2S D (mod 256).
Then, one has
(S mod T ) = S mod 128
gcd (D, 256)
= (2S D) mod 2D · 128
gcd (D, 256)
= (2S D) mod
(
256 · D
gcd (D, 256)
)
, 0,
thereby contradicting with the given condition. So, the
property is proved.
Assume that Yl uniformly distributes over {0, 1, 2} for
l = 0 ∼ 3MN − 1, one can calculate the probability that
condition (13) in Property 2 hold for a given l∗ and T ,
Prob
[
Yl∗+S < {Yl}l
∗+S−1
l=l∗
]
=

(
2
3
)kT
·
1
3
 ,
where k ∈ {1, · · · , ⌊2MN/T ⌋}. Then, an upper bound of the
probability that condition (13) hold can be got as
Prob(MN) =
∑⌊2MN/T ⌋
k=1
(3MN − kT )

(
2
3
)kT
·
1
3
 .
When T = 128, one can calculate Prob(2272 · 1704) ≈
1.1173 ·10−16 for a relatively big plain-image of size 2272×
1704. As for plain-images of smaller size, one can assure
that the success probability of this attack is much bigger
than (1 − 1.12 · 10−16) due to that the following points hold
at the same time.
• The upper bound probability Prob(MN) is a strictly
increasing function with respect to MN;
• Even Eq. (13) holds, Ŷ∗l = Y∗l would still happen with
probability 12 or
1
3 ;
• The value of Prob(MN) is calculated by summarizing
the probability of some cases that may happen simul-
taneously.
Based on the above analysis, one can conclude that break-
ing of the Substitution part can be implemented success-
fully with an extremely high probability.
Once the equivalent secret key determining Substitution
is recovered, the image encryption algorithm under study
becomes a position permutation-only gray-scale image en-
cryption algorithm composing of the Row permutation and
the Column permutation. Considering the number of possi-
ble positions of every plain-pixel is 3MN, the bit length of
each element of chosen plaintext should be ⌈log2(3MN)⌉ to
assure that every permuted elements are different from each
other. As bit size of every channel of plain-image is fixed
to 8, only ⌈(log2(3MN))/8⌉ pairs of chosen plain-images
are required to recover the equivalent version of {Tl}3M−1l=0
and {T ∗i,l}
M−1,3N−1
i=0,l=0 . Referring to quantitative cryptanaly-
sis of permutation-only encryption algorithms in [19, 20],
the complexity of breaking the position permutation part is
only O(3MN).
To validate the performance of the proposed attack, a
great number of experiments on some plain-images of size
512 × 512 were made with some randomly selected secret
keys. When µ0 = 4.0, x0 = 0.123456789764, m1 = 1000,
µ∗0 = 3.999999, x∗0 = 0.567891234567 and m2 = 2000, two
chosen plain-images of fixed pixel value 127 and 0, shown
in Fig. 1a) and b) respectively, are used to recover the PRNS
{Yl}3MN−1l=0 . Then, ⌈(log2(3 × 29 · 29))/8⌉ = 3 pairs of cho-
sen plain-image are constructed to recover the equivalent
secret of the position permutation-only part. Finally, the
equivalent versions of the sub-keys controlling two main
encryption parts are used together to break a cipher-image
encrypted with the same secret key, which is shown in
Fig. 1c). The decryption result is shown in Fig. 1d) and
it is identical with the original plain-image, which verifies
the effectiveness of the proposed attack.
4. Conclusion
This paper studied the security of a novel colour image
encryption algorithm based on chaos proposed in [17]. It
is found that the encryption algorithm can be broken with
chosen-plaintext attack efficiently. The number of required
chosen plain-images and complexity of the attacking are
4
a) b)
c) d)
Figure 1: Chosen-plaintext attack: a) the chosen plain-image of fixed
value 127; b) the chosen plain-image of fixed value 0; c) the cipher-
image of plain-image “Baboon”; d) the recovered plain-image of the im-
age shown in Fig. 1c).
proportional to a logarithm of size of plain-images and the
size, respectively. As a conclusion, the image encryption
algorithm under study is not suggested in serious applica-
tions requiring a high level of security.
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